Producing satisfactory outcomes in the implementation phase of PPP infrastructure projects: A fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis of 27 road constructions in the Netherlands by Verweij, Stefan
Producing Satisfactory Outcomes in the 
Implementation Phase of PPP Infrastructure Projects: 
A Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 27 
Road Constructions in the Netherlands 
 
Stefan Verweij 
 
 
This is the version of the article that was accepted for publication by the journal. The 
final, definitive article has been published in International Journal of Project 
Management by Elsevier, all rights reserved. 
 
Verweij, S. (2015). Producing Satisfactory Outcomes in the Implementation Phase of 
PPP Infrastructure Projects: A Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 27 Road 
Constructions in the Netherlands. International Journal of Project Management, 33 
(8), 1877-1887. 
 
Abstract 
 
An understudied aspect for the successful completion of PPP infrastructure projects 
is the extent to which they are satisfactorily implemented. Studying PPP 
implementation is important though, because well-planned projects can fail if project 
implementation is inadequately managed. This article aims to find out which 
management and public–private cooperation approaches produce satisfaction for 
public procurers in the implementation phase of different kinds of infrastructure 
projects. To this purpose, twenty-seven Dutch road construction projects are 
systematically analyzed with fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA). The 
results show four configurations that produce satisfaction. It is concluded that 
externally-oriented management, which is characterized by a stakeholder-oriented 
project implementation approach, and close public–private cooperation, where 
public and private partners work together closely and interactively, are important for 
achieving satisfaction. In less complex projects with narrower scopes, however, the 
partners may rely on less interactive forms of cooperation, more characterized by 
monitoring contract compliance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Current government policies require that projects are implemented in Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPPs), using innovative contract types such as Design, Build, Finance, 
and Maintain (DBFM), with minimal impact on the environment (in terms of, e.g., 
noise nuisance and road availability) and maximum quality, and for as low as 
possible budgets. Rijkswaterstaat, the major public procurer of transportation 
infrastructure in the Netherlands, is a case in point (Rijkswaterstaat, 2014). It has a 
“the market unless” policy, wants to double its number of DBFM projects by 2020, 
aspires being a “public-oriented network manager” (Metze, 2010), and it wants to 
attain the same or higher levels of production (road construction and maintenance) 
with smaller budgets (Rijkswaterstaat, 2011). Such demands require careful project 
planning. Many studies have hence been conducted into PPP project planning, 
focusing especially on issues of procurement, tendering, risk allocation, and PPP 
finance (see Ke, Wang, Chan, & Cheung, 2009; Kwak, Chih, & Ibbs, 2009; Tang, 
Shen, & Cheng, 2010).  
However, the implementation (i.e., construction and delivery) of PPP projects is 
complex (cf. Baccarini, 1996; Bertelsen, 2003), involving many stakeholders with 
different and sometimes unforeseen changing interests, a multitude of regulatory 
frameworks and restrictions, and complex and sometimes unplanned physical and 
technical situations (De Bruijn & Leijten, 2008; Hertogh & Westerveld, 2010; 
Teisman, Westerveld, & Hertogh, 2009; Verweij & Gerrits, 2015). It means that 
projects can be well-planned and prepared, but that sound plans and good intensions 
in planning can nevertheless fail in implementation (e.g., Pressman & Wildavsky, 
[1973]1984). A striking example concerns a € 2.2 billion Dutch PPP project for the 
reconstruction of a 37 km highway corridor, where the obtained gains in the 
planning, procurement, and contracting of the project are being lost in the current 
implementation; newspapers reported budget overruns of € 250 million and 
increasing due to, inter alia, external project stakeholder complexity (see Verweij, 
2015b). It is therefore important to study how infrastructure projects can be 
successfully implemented. PPP implementation, however, is a relatively under-
researched topic in the literature. Research on PPPs in construction focusses instead 
on planning and pre-contract issues (Jones & Noble, 2008; Weihe, 2008). One 
reason for this dearth may be that, whereas the planning of projects is increasingly 
characterized by open and participatory management approaches, in implementation 
the project organizations are more closed systems focused on getting the project 
efficiently and effectively implemented (cf. Dimitriou, Ward, & Wright, 2013). This 
complicates access to projects. Relatedly, implementation data are often not made 
available as fears exist that analyses will lead to the identification of culprits for poor 
outcomes (see Verweij, 2015b). 
In response to this research gap, recent case study research has been performed 
(e.g., Verweij, 2015a; Verweij & Gerrits, 2015), stressing the importance of externally-
oriented management approaches and close and informal public-private cooperation 
for PPP infrastructure project implementation. Such case studies can provide 
valuable in-depth insights into managing the complexity of project implementation 
(cf. Blomquist, Hällgren, Nilsson, & Söderholm, 2010; Cicmil, Williams, Thomas, & 
Hodgson, 2006). However, infrastructure projects are no one size fits all; e.g., a 
DBFM contract may require different cooperation and management orientations than 
a Design and Construct (D&C) contract. It means that case study findings are hard to 
generalize, exactly because they emphasize the complexity of the infrastructure 
projects (Verweij & Gerrits, 2013). What is hence needed is comparative research that 
can strike a balance between highlighting the unique aspects of projects, as well as 
the commonalities between them. This article investigates whether different kinds of 
infrastructure projects – in terms of contract type, project scope, and project size – 
may be (or need to be) managed differently to have a satisfactory implementation 
process. To that purpose, it studies a medium-n of project implementations applying 
fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis or fsQCA (Ragin, 2008), a methodological 
approach that was recently proposed for infrastructure project research (Verweij & 
Gerrits, 2013), that is well-suited for striking a balance between in-depth insights and 
generalization. 
An important issue here is the outcome measure. Infrastructure projects are 
implemented in complex social environments, which requires a public procurer to 
take into account more project outcomes than just the iron triangle’s measures of 
cost, time, and quality (Atkinson, 1999; Dimitriou et al., 2013; Jeffares, Sullivan, & 
Bovaird, 2013). Infrastructure projects may be completed within time and budget and 
according to specifications, but public values such as transparency or accountability 
(e.g., Reynaers, 2014) may have been impaired, the public-private relationship may 
be strained, or external project stakeholders’ interests (such as those of citizens, 
municipalities, or businesses) may have been harmed by the project. Such project 
outcomes relate to the core responsibilities of government served by public procurers. 
The iron triangle thus does not capture well the complexity of what constitutes a 
successful project implementation. The concept of ‘satisfaction’ is better able to 
capture the variety of outcomes being produced in implementation (cf. Kärnä, 
Junnonen, Manninen, & Julin, 2013; Lehtiranta, Kärnä, Junnonen, & Julin, 2012; 
Verweij, 2015a; Verweij & Gerrits, 2015). In this article, satisfaction is the aggregate 
measure of eight different implementation outcomes, as further detailed later. The 
research question is: which management and public-private cooperation approaches 
produce satisfactory outcomes in the implementation phase of different kinds of 
infrastructure projects? 
The article is further structured as follows. In Section 2, literature and previous 
research are discussed, explaining and motivating the main concepts of this research 
which form the framework for the analysis. To answer the research question, twenty-
seven Dutch road constructions are analyzed. Section 3 presents and explains the 
data and the methods used for the analysis. The analysis and results are provided in 
Section 4. Section 5 comprises the discussion of the results and limitations of 
research. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6. 
 
2. Managing infrastructure project implementation 
 
This section describes the main concepts that formed the framework of the research. 
This study focusses on the question which management and public-private 
cooperation approaches produce satisfactory outcomes in different kinds of projects. 
Section 2.1 discusses literature to explain the different management and public-
private cooperation approaches, and the satisfaction outcome measure. Section 2.2 
focusses on the characteristics by which projects of different kinds can be 
distinguished: contract type, project scope, and project size. Table 1 provides a brief 
overview of the elements in the framework, as further detailed below. 
 
Table 1: Summary of the framework for the analysis 
 Abbreviation 
Approaches   
Management 
Externally-oriented management MAN 
Internally-oriented management man 
Public-private cooperation 
Cooperative COOP 
Contractual coop 
Project characteristics   
Contract type 
Design and Construct CON 
DBFM con 
Project scope 
Wide scope: integral projects SCOPE 
Narrow scope: single function scope 
Project size 
Large budget SIZE 
Small budget size 
 
2.1. Management, public-private cooperation, and satisfaction 
 
In their research on the management of large infrastructure projects, Edelenbos and 
Klijn (2009) distinguished between project management and process management 
(see also De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof, & In’t Veld, 2010; Edelenbos & Teisman, 2008). 
Project management is characterized by a closed, internal project orientation. 
Indicators are: minimal information is provided to the stakeholder environment 
about the project’s progress, the emphasis is on making progress by speeding up 
processes, solutions for problems are sought in the project organization so as to 
promote the project interest, management persists on achieving pre-determined 
goals regardless of changing circumstances, and communication to the stakeholder 
environment takes a DAD-strategy (decide, announce, and defend) (Edelenbos & 
Klijn, 2009). This internally-oriented approach is often associated with traditional 
modes of management that emphasize the iron triangle measures of success 
(Edelenbos & Teisman, 2008). The contrasting process management approach 
embodies the idea that stakeholder interests in project implementation should be 
prominently addressed (De Bruijn et al., 2010; Edelenbos & Klijn, 2009). It is 
characterized by an open, external project orientation. Indicators are: the project is 
accessible to interested parties, the emphasis is on creating or maintaining support 
for the project, solutions are sought together with external stakeholders, management 
is receptive and flexible to changing circumstances, and communication takes a 
DDD-strategy (dialogue, decide, and deliver) (see Edelenbos & Klijn, 2009).  
In studying the two management approaches, scholars found that the 
externally-oriented process management approach is associated with better outcomes 
(Edelenbos & Klijn, 2009; Verweij, 2015a; Verweij & Gerrits, 2015; cf. De Bruijn et 
al., 2010) since implementing infrastructure projects does not happen in isolation; 
they are implemented in a social context of external project stakeholders. Because 
these stakeholders, such as municipalities or interest groups, can hamper or advance 
project implementation (Olander & Landin, 2005), for example by granting or not 
granting permits, this creates interdependencies between the internal and external 
project stakeholders. This idea is well-documented in network management theory 
(e.g., Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004) and stakeholder (management) theories (see Atkin & 
Skitmore, 2008). The interdependencies require that addressing stakeholders is 
crucial so as to achieve satisfactory outcomes (cf. El-Gohary, Osman, & El-Diraby, 
2006). 
In carrying out either the project or process management approach, the public 
principal and private contractor may operate in a less or more cooperative fashion. A 
distinction can be made between a more cooperative and a more contractual 
approach (see Edelenbos & Klijn, 2009; Edelenbos & Teisman, 2008). The 
contractual approach is characterized by a strong emphasis on the contract, limited 
interaction between the public and private partners, and on monitoring compliance 
with the contract. By contrast, indicators for the more cooperative orientation are: 
less emphasis on the contract, ‘working together’ does not stop once the contract is 
signed but continues in the implementation of the project, and it is characterized by 
more public-private interaction and mutual trust.  
Recent research shows that the cooperative orientation is associated with better 
outcomes in project implementation (cf. Verweij, 2015a; Verweij & Gerrits, 2015). 
Often, when contracts have been signed, the public-private relationship changes from 
one of collaborative plan development to one in which the contractor alone manages 
implementation. This, however, may leave potential resources untapped: public 
principals often have longer-standing relationships with local external project 
stakeholders than private contractors, and they may use these relationships to 
manage external stakeholder issues more effectively (Verweij, 2015a; cf. De Schepper, 
Dooms, & Haezendonck, 2014). Other studies also indicate the positive relationship 
between cooperation and outcomes in infrastructure projects (e.g., Chan, Chan, & Ho, 
2003; Larson, 1997). 
In this article, it is understood that a project is successfully being implemented 
when satisfactory outcomes are produced. Satisfaction entails different things, 
depending on the goals of the project procurer. The standard outcomes of costs, time, 
and quality matter, but other outcomes often co-determine whether a project 
implementation is regarded as successful or not (Jeffares et al., 2013). Amongst other 
things, a good public-private relationship, safety, risks, political support, and external 
stakeholder satisfaction are also important criteria to public procurers (see, e.g., 
Jeffares et al., 2013; Verweij, 2015b). The concept of satisfaction captures this 
heterogeneous and multi-dimensional nature of implementation outcomes (cf. 
Lehtiranta et al., 2012). The actual criteria to measure satisfaction depend on the 
multiple project goals as set by the procurer and thus have to be determined 
empirically (cf. Verweij & Gerrits, 2013; see Section 3.3.1). Satisfaction, then, is the 
aggregate measure of the different outcomes in a project (see further Section 3.3.1). 
The study of satisfaction in infrastructure projects receives growing attention, as it is 
increasingly recognized that satisfaction is able to complement the traditional 
performance measures of time, cost, and quality (cf. Atkinson, 1999; Kärnä et al., 
2013; Lehtiranta et al., 2012; Leung, Ng, & Cheung, 2004). 
 
2.2. Contract type, project scope, and project size 
 
As said, previous research found that a more externally-oriented management 
approach, and a more cooperative management approach, produces satisfactory 
outcomes in the implementation phase of projects. That research, however, largely 
relied on case studies (Verweij, 2015a; Verweij & Gerrits, 2015). Case studies provide 
in-depth insights into the reasons for the different satisfaction levels but, by 
implication, the extent to which these explanations apply to a wider range of projects 
is not well-known. Interestingly though, a comparison of two case studies showed 
that the studied projects had different levels of satisfaction and were characterized by 
different management approaches (Verweij, 2015b). It pointed to three possible 
explanatory project characteristics for the differences: contract type, project scope, 
and project size. 
− The contract type. The satisfactory project implementation concerned a D&C 
contract and the other one a DBFM contract. Assuming a broad definition of 
PPP, a D&C project is a partnership where, in contrast to typical public 
procurement, the contractor is also responsible for the design of the project 
(Yescombe, 2007). In DBFM contracts (see, e.g., Yescombe, 2007), another kind 
of PPP, the contractor additionally bears responsibility for project financing and 
maintenance. Especially characteristic for DBFM contracts is that they insert 
clear contractual divisions into the partnership (cf. Edelenbos & Teisman, 2008; 
Klijn & Teisman, 2005), instigating a contractual approach to cooperation. 
Indeed, the philosophy of this contract type is that the market’s potential is 
maximally used when the government is minimally involved in project 
implementation, only in terms of monitoring contract compliance. Project 
success largely depends on achieving predefined milestones (because these 
milestones are linked to periodic payments by the public principal, and 
therefore to the financial constructions between the contractor and lenders). 
− The project scope. The satisfactory project implementation involved the 
reconstruction of a highway into a 2.3 km long tunnel, combined with inner-city 
urban development. This integrality of the project, combining different spatial 
functions, means that many different stakeholders are involved with their 
interests embedded in the project scope. In fact, local and regional governments 
were co-principals in the project together with Rijkswaterstaat. For these local 
project stakeholders, communication and stakeholder management were top 
priorities and principal and contractor cooperated closely herein. In this way, 
the broad project scope instigated cooperative and externally-oriented 
management approaches (cf. Nijkamp, Van der Burch, & Vindigni, 2002). In 
contrast, the other project implementation involved one spatial function: the 
reconstruction of a 37 km long highway corridor. Rijkswaterstaat bore sole 
responsibility for the corridor and was the principal of the project. External 
stakeholders were not closely involved, and rather acted to minimize the impact 
of the project on their interests. This instigated internally-oriented approaches. 
− The project size. A third characteristic in which projects differ is project size is. 
This was not suggested in the individual case studies as a possible explanatory 
project characteristic (although the second project is over three times larger 
than the first one), but other studies have suggested it as a possible determinant 
for satisfaction in Dutch projects. These studies have suggested that 
infrastructure projects with smaller budgets tend to have larger average 
percentages of cost overrun (Verweij, Van Meerkerk, & Korthagen, 2015; 
Cantarelli, van Wee, Molin, & Flyvbjerg, 2012), for instance because the larger 
projects are linked to the most capable managers (Verweij et al., 2015). 
Conversely, larger projects, as evidenced by the case studies, may attract more 
socio-political attention, are riskier, and easier criticized. As said, these are also 
factors that constitute satisfaction. 
In summation, previous research has identified that externally-oriented and 
cooperative approaches produce satisfaction in project implementation, and in the 
present study it is investigated whether different kinds of infrastructure projects (in 
terms of the three characteristics) indeed might be (or need to be) managed 
differently. To this purpose, twenty-seven Dutch road constructions are 
comparatively analyzed. 
 
3. Methods and data 
 
3.1. Data collection 
 
The project implementation data were collected from the Rijkswaterstaat project 
database, which contains both qualitative and quantitative project data (see Section 
3.3). Rijkswaterstaat is the major Dutch procurer of public transportation 
infrastructure with an annual turnover of approximately € 5 billion (Rijkswaterstaat, 
2014). The selection and collection of the relevant data from the database took place 
between November 2013 and June 2014 at the Rijkswaterstaat office in Utrecht (the 
Netherlands). The database contained 134 projects, twenty-seven of which had data 
about the project implementation phase that was detailed enough for analysis. A few 
projects had some missing data, which were completed by consulting MIRT Project 
Books (e.g., Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, 2013) and 
Rijkswaterstaat managers.1 Publishing about the data was allowed, provided that the 
projects were anonymized. The project-identifiers used in the analysis (see the tables) 
correspond to the identifiers in the Rijkswaterstaat database. 
 
3.2. Method: fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis 
 
The methodological approach applied in this research is fuzzy set qualitative 
comparative analysis or fsQCA (Ragin, 2008). Five reasons motivate this choice. 
First, the configurational nature of fsQCA allows studying management and 
cooperation in different kinds of projects. In fsQCA, cases (here: the twenty-seven 
project implementations) are understood as combinations of conditions, i.e., 
configurations (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). This means that different kinds are 
distinguished in terms of the different possible combinations of the characteristics of 
contract type, project scope, and project size. Second, because it is a set-theoretic 
method, fsQCA allows studying how different kinds of projects can be, or need to be, 
managed differently. In fsQCA, each case has membership between 0 and 1 in each 
condition (i.e., management, cooperation, contract type, project scope, and project 
size) and the outcome (i.e., satisfaction) (Ragin, 2008). Each condition has cross-over 
points that separate qualitatively different cases from each other. By systematically 
comparing configurations that agree on the outcome but differ in one of the 
conditions, conditions (or configurations) are identified that are necessary (‘need to 
be’) or sufficient (‘can be’) to produce the outcome. Basically, a condition is necessary 
when it has to be present for the outcome to occur and it is sufficient if it can produce 
the outcome by itself (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Third, fsQCA strikes a balance 
between in-depth case knowledge of the case’s complexities on the one hand, and 
identifying commonalities between cases on the other hand (Verweij & Gerrits, 2013). 
Fourth and related, it is very suitable for studying a medium-n of cases, such as the 
twenty-seven in this article (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009). Fifth and finally, fsQCA was 
chosen over other QCA variants, such as crisp-set QCA or multi-value QCA, because 
of the availability of quantitative data in the Rijkswaterstaat database (see Section 
3.3). 
The comparative fsQCA process entailed a number of steps (see Verweij, 2015a). 
After the Rijkswaterstaat project data were collected and coded, the first step in the 
fsQCA was the construction of the data matrix. This involved calibration: the 
transformation of the raw project data into fuzzy scores between 0 and 1 by clustering 
similar cases per condition (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). The calibration process 
                                                            
1 The MIRT is the Multi-Year Plan for Infrastructure, Spatial Planning and Transport. 
and data matrix are important parts of fsQCA and they are reported in Section 3.3. 
Each row in the data matrix represents a project implementation as a configuration.  
The second step was grouping project implementation cases together that 
exhibited the same configuration. This led to the truth table (see Section 4), listing all 
the logically possible configurations and showing which configurations are covered by 
which cases (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). With five conditions, there are 32 (i.e., 
2^5) logically possible configurations.2  
The third step was the truth table minimization (see Section 4): comparing truth 
table rows that agree on the outcome and differ in one of the conditions. It often 
occurs in fsQCA that truth table rows are covered by cases with opposite outcomes. 
Such logical contradictions are expressed with the consistency value (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012). A consistency of 1.0 means a configuration has no contradictions; 
lower values signal imperfect relationships between the configuration and the 
outcome. When the consistency of a truth table row was high enough, i.e., when it is 
higher than the consistency cutoff point (see Schneider & Wagemann, 2012), then it 
was assigned the outcome (i.e., 1); if not, it was assigned the non-outcome (i.e., 0) 
(see Section 4). 
The final step was the interpretation and discussion of the results – also called 
‘solutions’ in fsQCA – of the truth table minimization (see Section 5.1), in terms of the 
cases that are covered by the patterns and in terms of theoretical expectations 
(Verweij, 2015a). Whereas the previous steps in the fsQCA process quantify the data 
and analysis to aid a transparent comparison of the medium-n of project 
implementation cases, this final step is a return to the qualitative data. It is needed to 
interpret and understand the meaning of the results. The process that is briefly 
summarized here was iterative (see Rihoux, 2013; Rihoux & Lobe, 2009); inter alia, 
contradictions signaled the researcher to return to the qualitative case data, which led 
to recalibration. 
 
3.3. Data and calibration 
 
Prior to the calibration, first the level of completeness was calculated for each project 
to ensure their comparability. The completeness level is defined as the number of 
days between the start of the implementation phase (i.e., ‘project realization’) and the 
date at which the project data were measured, divided by the number of days between 
the start of the implementation and the (planned) project delivery date. Depending 
on the completeness level, the project data were measured at January 1st 2012 (i.e., 
data about 2011), 2013 (i.e., data about 2012), or 2014 (i.e., data about 2013). For 
instance, the D&C project mentioned above started construction on 14-2-2011, has a 
planned delivery date of 16-12-2016, and the data were measured at January 1st 2014. 
This resulted in a level of completeness of 49%. The average completeness level of the 
                                                            
2 Configurations that are empirically absent (i.e., ‘empty truth table rows’) are called logical 
remainders (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). These are sometimes used later in the comparative 
process as counterfactuals, so as to generate more parsimonious patterns (Ragin & Sonnett, 2005). 
projects was 73%, with a median of 74%, and a standard deviation of 17%. The project 
implementation cases are thus fairly similar with regard to their completeness. 
The calibrated data are shown in Table 2. For the conditions project size (SIZE) 
and contract type (CONT), and for the outcome satisfaction (SATIS), the raw data are 
also provided. Due to space restrictions, for the conditions project scope (SCOPE), 
management (MAN), and cooperation (COOP), only the calibrated data are provided. 
The data and calibration are now explained in detail (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). 
Table 2: Data matrix 
Project Data CONT SCOPE SIZE MAN COOP SATIS Completeness 
Raw Cal. Raw (k€) Cal. Raw Cal. 
P.0008 2013 D&C 1 0.33 278146 0.67 0.67 0.33 13.00 0.67 59% 
P.0029 2013 D&C 1 0.00 274787 0.67 0.33 0.00 16.00 1.00 102% 
P.0034 2013 D&C 1 1.00 620693 1.00 1.00 1.00 15.00 1.00 49% 
P.0059 2011 D&C 1 0.33 114215 0.33 0.67 0.00 15.00 1.00 70% 
P.0077 2012 D&C 1 0.67 276962 0.67 0.67 0.33 14.00 1.00 76% 
P.0094 2013 D&C 1 1.00 319694 0.67 1.00 0.67 11.67 0.33 83% 
P.0095 2012 D&C 1 0.00 97741 0.33 0.67 0.33 14.67 1.00 69% 
P.0096 2011 D&C 1 0.00 103709 0.33 0.33 0.00 12.00 0.33 85% 
P.0102 2011 D&C 1 0.00 48783 0.00 1.00 0.00 14.00 1.00 76% 
P.0149 2013 D&C 1 0.67 686322 1.00 1.00 0.33 11.00 0.33 41% 
P.0165 2011 D&C 1 0.33 211000 0.33 0.33 0.00 9.67 0.00 96% 
P.0179 2013 D&C 1 0.00 121555 0.33 1.00 0.33 9.67 0.00 46% 
P.0190 2013 DBFM 0 0.67 2268904 1.00 0.00 0.00 8.67 0.00 65% 
P.0196 2012 D&C 1 0.67 127013 0.33 1.00 1.00 15.33 1.00 77% 
P.0200 2011 D&C 1 0.00 55391 0.00 1.00 0.00 15.00 1.00 90% 
P.0218 2012 DBFM 0 0.67 2187177 1.00 0.67 0.33 10.67 0.33 67% 
P.0227 2013 D&C 1 0.67 300261 0.67 0.67 0.00 11.33 0.33 56% 
P.0247 2012 DBFM 0 0.00 683008 1.00 1.00 1.00 16.00 1.00 89% 
P.0272 2013 D&C 1 0.33 547430 0.67 0.67 0.67 14.67 1.00 74% 
P.0319 2013 D&C 1 0.00 54750 0.00 0.33 0.00 15.00 1.00 89% 
P.0351 2013 DBFM 0 0.00 332229 0.67 1.00 0.67 14.67 1.00 45% 
P.0631 2013 D&C 1 0.00 9488 0.00 1.00 0.33 15.33 1.00 88% 
P.0641 2012 D&C 1 0.00 163773 0.33 1.00 0.00 16.00 1.00 101% 
P.0755 2013 D&C 1 0.00 159293 0.33 0.33 0.00 14.67 1.00 68% 
P.1106 2013 D&C 1 0.33 21473 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.00 0.00 56% 
P.2355 2012 D&C 1 0.00 42997 0.00 0.00 0.33 10.67 0.33 85% 
P.2365 2012 D&C 1 0.00 320761 0.67 1.00 0.00 12.67 0.67 63% 
3.3.1. Satisfaction 
 
Three times a year, the Rijkswaterstaat project managers qualitatively assess their 
project on multiple outcomes: budget of the project, cash prognosis, achievement of 
milestones, risk management, administrative-political issues, public-orientedness, 
cooperation with the market, and safety in the project.3 Based on their assessments, 
the managers score their project on each outcome with either code red (low 
satisfaction, 0 points), code orange (medium satisfaction, 1 point), or code green 
(satisfaction, 2 points). These assessments are used by the Rijkswaterstaat project 
managers to report the implementation progress to the Rijkswaterstaat hierarchy, 
and they are used by the managers themselves to monitor their project’s 
implementation process. Unavoidably, there is some subjectivity in the assessments 
because they are qualitative, but factual data about the projects are used by the 
managers to support their assessments, e.g., they provide examples of events that 
occurred in the implementation, and they use inter alia financial data, risk 
management data, and safety reports. It is in the interest of the projects and 
Rijkswaterstaat that the assessments are as accurate as possible about the state of 
affairs of the projects. Satisfaction in this article is measured by aggregating the 
scores for the eight outcomes and then averaging the year’s three measurements. 
Using the QCA Tosmana software (Cronqvist, 2011), a cluster analysis was 
performed to group similar projects and separate different ones. This is illustrated in 
Figure 1. The blocks in the figure represent the twenty-seven cases. The cluster 
analysis led to the identification of three cross-over points: 10.17, 12.34, and 13.50. As 
shown in the figure, it means that the twenty-seven projects are divided into four 
groups. This resulted in the following fuzzy four-value calibration (see Ragin, 
2008): 4 
− Very low satisfaction: 0.00 (8.67-10.17); 
− Low satisfaction: 0.33 (10.18-12.34); 
− High satisfaction: 0.67 (12.35-13.50); 
− Very high satisfaction: 1.00 (13.51-16.00). 
 
  
                                                            
3 Three outcomes were not used (i.e., signing of scope documents, capacity of the principal’s project 
team, and evaluation of project quality). These could not be related, based on the qualitative empirical 
data, to management or public-private cooperation in the project. They concerned Rijkswaterstaat-
internal issues rather than project-related issues. 
4 A finer-grained scale was not used because the manager’s qualitative assessments did not allow the 
interpretation of small differences in project satisfaction scores. 
Figure 1: Calibration for SATIS 
 
 
3.3.2. Management and cooperation 
 
For the management and cooperation orientations in the projects, only qualitative 
data were available: general management summaries (one report per year), 
stakeholder environment reports (three reports per year), and market cooperation 
reports (three reports per year). The seven reports per project, 202 pages in total, 
were coded with qualitative data-analysis software (Provalis Research, 2013). E.g., if 
a text fragment fitted with indicators for externally-oriented management (see 
Section 2.1) then it was coded as such. Based on the coded data, qualitative project 
descriptions were constructed and these were cross-compared (cf. Ragin, 1992; e.g., 
Verweij, 2015a). This process had two iterations – a few small contradictions led to 
reexamination of some project data, recoding, and a recalibration – as is common in 
fsQCA (see Section 3.2), and resulted in four clusters of projects, with scores of 0.00, 
0.33, 0.67, or 1.00.  
− Low scores (0.00 and 0.33) indicate an (very) internal management orientation 
and contractual orientation; 
− High scores (0.67 and 1.00) indicate an (very) external management orientation 
and cooperative orientation. 
 
3.3.3. Contract type, project scope, and project size 
 
The contract type has two possible values: D&C and DBFM. The D&C projects were 
assigned a score of 1.00 and the DBFM projects were assigned a score of 0.00. With 
regard to the project scope, four project clusters were identified: 
− Standard road construction projects: 0.00; 
− Road projects that also included the construction of several new (i.e., not just 
the renovation of existing ones) tunnels or bridges: 0.33; 
− More complex road projects with large new tunnels or bridges: 0.67; 
− Integral projects that combine several spatial functions: 1.00. 
The project size was measured by taking the projected final expenditures of the 
projects. The largest project has a size of € 2,269 million (i.e., over € 2.2 billion). The 
smallest project is just under € 9.5 million. In the same way as with the outcome 
measure (cf. Section 3.3.1 and Figure 1), the cluster analysis identified three cross-
over points: € 76.566 million, € 242.894 million, and € 584.061 million. This 
resulted in the following calibration (cf. Cantarelli et al., 2012): 
− Small projects: 0.00 (€ 9.488 to € 76.566 million); 
− Medium projects: 0.33 (€ 76.567 to € 242.894 million); 
− Large projects: 0.67 (€ 242.895 to € 584.061 million); 
− Very large projects: 1.00 (€ 584.062 to € 2.268.904 million). 
 
4. Analysis and results5 
 
This section explains the analysis, which was performed with the QCA package in R 
(Duşa & Thiem, 2014; Thiem & Duşa, 2013). The analysis comprises the third and 
fourth steps in the fsQCA process: the truth table construction, and then the truth 
table minimization which produces the results (see Section 3.2).  
The truth table construction resulted in Table 3. The consistency cutoff point is 
0.875 (see the “incl.” column), i.e.: configurations with values of 0.875 or higher are 
assigned the outcome. Four arguments substantiate this cutoff (see Ragin, 2009; 
Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). First, it is well above the lowest ‘permitted’ value of 
0.75. Second, a clear gap in consistency values can be recognized at 0.875. Third, the 
high PRI (i.e., Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency) scores (see Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012) indicate a big difference between the configurations’ consistency 
scores for high satisfaction and low satisfaction. Fourth and most importantly, the 
cutoff point is substantiated by the examination of the cases covered by the 
configurations.
                                                            
5 This section focusses on the truth table analysis, which is the analysis of sufficiency. The necessity 
analysis revealed that there are no conditions or configurations that can be considered necessary 
according to the commonly accepted consistency threshold of 0.9 (Ragin, 2009). Only three conditions 
had consistency values above a 0.8 threshold: scope (con. 0.818, cov. 0.775), CONT (con. 0.873, cov. 
0.695), and SIZE+coop (con. 0.873, cov. 0.685). 
Table 3: Truth table 
No. CONT SCOPE SIZE MAN COOP SATIS n incl. PRI Cases 
8 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 1.000 1.000 P.0247, P.0351 
28 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1.000 1.000 P.0196 
21 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0.909 0.875 P.0029 
32 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 0.898 0.854 P.0034, P.0094 
19 1 0 0 1 0 1 7 0.884 0.864 P.0059, P.0095, P.0102, P.0179, P.0200, P.0631, 
P.0641 
23 1 0 1 1 0 1 2 0.875 0.819 P.0008, P.2365 
24 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0.875 0.834 P.0272 
31 1 1 1 1 0 0 3 0.724 0.568 P.0077, P.0149, P.0227 
17 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 0.681 0.597 P.0096, P.0165, P.0319, P.0755, P.1106, P.2355 
15 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0.493 0.000 P.0218 
13 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.330 0.000 P.0190 
This examination revealed that configurations 8, 21, 23, 24, and 28 are covered 
by project implementation cases that all have (very) high satisfaction. The 
configurations with consistency scores below the 0.875 cutoff point are all covered by 
(a clear majority of) cases with (very) low satisfaction. Two of the configurations 
above the cutoff point, however, can be considered contradictions but where 
nevertheless coded as producing satisfactory outcomes. The reasons are as follows. 
Configuration 32, covered by cases P.0034 and P.0094, is a contradiction 
because P.0094 has a satisfaction score of 0.33 (see Table 2). However, the raw 
satisfaction score for P.0094 is closer to a fuzzy value of 0.67 (i.e., 12.34-11.67=0.67) 
than to a value of 0.00 (i.e., 11.67-10.18=1.49). Moreover, the managers’ qualitative 
assessments revealed that the project implementation had multiple orange codes not 
so much because managers were dissatisfied with the implementation, but rather to 
signal to the Rijkswaterstaat hierarchy that the project had a “high risk profile” and 
thus required unabated management attention. Given these considerations, the truth 
table row was still assigned the outcome (i.e., 1). 
The second contradiction concerns case P.0179 in configuration 19. The 
managers’ assessments showed that this case is a clear low-performer. Managers 
identified that the contractor’s “knowledge and information systems” were not 
trustworthy, which also negatively influenced, inter alia, the public-private 
relationship, the project risks, and the achievement of implementation milestones. 
Despite this case, the configuration was still assigned the outcome, because the other 
six cases all have a satisfaction score of 1.00. The contradiction is reflected in the less-
than-perfect consistency score and is discussed in the next section. 
The next step is the truth table minimization. The results of the minimization 
are presented in Table 4.6 It shows which management and public-private 
cooperation approaches produce satisfactory outcomes in different kinds of projects. 
Uppercase letters in the table indicate a 0.67-1.00 condition score (e.g., SCOPE 
means a wide scope), and lowercase letters indicate a 0.00-0.33 condition score (e.g., 
scope means a narrow scope). 
                                                            
6 The table gives the conservative solution. The intermediate solution (see Schneider & Wagemann, 
2012) was also produced by including logical remainders based on two directional expectations: COOP 
and MAN contribute to producing satisfaction. Comparing the intermediate solution with the 
conservative solution, it was found that in effect case P.0272 now covered all minimized 
configurations, resulting is more parsimonious patterns: CONT*MAN*COOP (incl. 0.874, cov.r 
0.254), CONT*scope*MAN (incl. 0.858, cov.r 0.545), CONT*scope*SIZE (incl. 0.895, cov.r 0.308), 
and scope*SIZE*MAN*COOP (incl. 0.929, cov.r 0.236). Because the substantial simplification that 
was accomplished in the intermediate solution was caused only by P.0272, this was considered a too 
meager basis for drawing much more parsimonious conclusions. Therefore, this article focusses on the 
conservative solution. Finally, it must be mentioned (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010) that the 
parsimonious solution was: COOP + (scope*SIZE + scope*MAN) (incl. 0.865, cov.r 0.818). 
Table 4: Results 
 Minimized 
configuration 
incl. cov.r cov.u Cases 
1 CONT*SCOPE*MAN*COOP 0.907 0.181 0.091 P.0196; P.0034, P.0094 
2 CONT*scope*MAN*coop 0.871 0.491 0.237 P.0059, P.0095, P.0102, 
P.0179, P.0200, P.0631, 
P.0641; P.0008, P.2365 
3 CONT*scope*SIZE*coop 0.883 0.272 0.019 P.0029; P.0008, P.2365 
4 scope*SIZE*MAN*COOP 0.929 0.236 0.128 P.0247, P.0351; P.0272 
 Solution 0.891 0.746  
Notes: uppercase abbreviations indicate a high fuzzy score (0.67-1.00) (i.e., D&C contracts, wide 
scope, large project size, externally-oriented management, and a cooperative orientation) and 
lowercase abbreviations indicate a low fuzzy score (0.00-0.33) (i.e., DBFM contracts, narrow scope, 
small project size, internally-oriented management, and a contractual orientation). 
 
To complete the fsQCA, an analysis was also performed for low satisfaction, for 
which a separate truth table was constructed (not reported in the present article). 
Given the consistency scores in that truth table, only the two configurations covered 
by cases P.0190 and P.0218 (see Table 3), could be included in the truth table 
minimization. Both cases have low satisfaction (see Table 2). Combining these two 
configurations yielded cont*SCOPE*SIZE*coop as being associated with low 
satisfaction (with incl. 1.000, cov. 0.154). 
 
5. Discussion 
 
5.1. Interpretation and discussion of the results 
 
This section concerns the final step in the fsQCA process: the interpretation of the 
patterns in light of the underlying in-depth case data and theoretical expectations 
(see Section 3.2). 
The first result in Table 4 – CONT*SCOPE*MAN*COOP – states that in projects 
with a D&C contract and a wide scope, externally-oriented management combined 
with a cooperative public-private approach produces satisfactory outcomes. This 
result underscores the importance of externally-oriented management and a 
cooperative relationship, thus substantiating previous research (see Section 2.1) into 
the management of PPP projects (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2009; Verweij & Gerrits, 2015). 
The case data showed that in each of the three project implementations covered by 
the pattern, technically and socio-politically complex and innovative project scopes – 
in two cases inner-city urban development (P.0034 and P.0094) – were implemented 
in close cooperation with external project stakeholders and between the public and 
private partners (see also Lenferink, 2014). Stakeholders were co-principals in the 
project (P.0034), or they were proactively involved in the project implementation 
(P.0094) to tackle problems upfront. In the projects, there was intensive 
communication towards citizens via, e.g., Facebook, newsletters, information-
meetings, emails, and construction site visits. The communication monitors deployed 
in the projects found that this was appreciated by the citizens, who showed 
understanding for the nuisances caused by the projects (cf. Hamersma, Tillema, 
Sussman, & Arts, 2014). Of course, the public and private partners in the projects had 
contracts that clearly defined roles and responsibilities. However, the sharing of 
knowledge for effective joint communication about the project (P.0034), the joint 
preparation of contract changes before they are formally submitted (P.0094), or the 
joint formulation of project goals and “celebration of small successes” (P.0196) 
proved effective and resulted in satisfaction. All projects had green codes for the 
outcome ‘cooperation with the market’, an important aspect of satisfactorily 
implementing infrastructure projects (cf. Chan et al., 2003; Larson, 1997). 
The second result – CONT*scope*MAN*coop – states that in projects with a 
D&C contract and a narrower scope, externally-oriented management combined with 
a contractual public-private approach also produces satisfaction. Compared to the 
previous pattern, this result shows that externally-oriented management remains 
important for achieving satisfaction (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2009; El-Gohary et al., 
2006), but that D&C projects with a narrower scope can also do without intensive 
public-private cooperation (cf. Verweij & Gerrits, 2015). The nine cases covered by 
this pattern were all more or less ‘straightforward projects’, such as the construction 
of new roads and additional traffic lanes. The results indicate that, whereas the more 
multifaceted, socio-politically complex, area-oriented projects involving multiple 
stakeholders (i.e., the previous pattern) require closer public-private cooperation, the 
more traditional line-oriented road projects can be implemented with a more 
contractual approach where the private contractor is more at distance from the public 
principal (cf. Geraldi, Maylor, & Williams, 2011; Heeres, Tillema, & Arts, 2012; 
Lenferink, 2014). Interestingly, note that the second pattern includes though, as 
mentioned in Section 4, the contradictory case P.0179. Comparing P.0179 with the 
other eight cases covered by the pattern, the contractor’s “knowledge and information 
systems” were not functioning well in the project. Because these systems serve to give 
public contractors the trust that the private partner is in control of the project’s 
quality management – i.e., Rijkswaterstaat monitors contract compliance at distance 
via system-based contract management – the trust of Rijkswaterstaat in the private 
partner was low. This made the contractual approach ineffective in this case. This 
contradictory case thus draws attention to the importance of well-functioning 
information systems, generating trust between the partners, as a precondition for an 
effective contractual approach to public-private cooperation. 
The result of the analysis for low satisfaction (i.e., cont*SCOPE*SIZE*coop) 
further substantiates the above discussed first two results from Table 4. It states that 
in DBFM projects that are large and multifaceted, a contractually-oriented approach 
is associated with low satisfaction. Whereas the first two patterns in Table 4 indicated 
that more complex projects with wide scopes need a cooperative public-private 
approach and that narrower scopes can do with a contractual approach, the result for 
the analysis of low satisfaction indicates that when a project with a complex wide 
scope is not managed with a cooperative approach, low satisfaction is indeed 
produced as a result. Looking into the case data for of P.0190 which was 
characterized by low satisfaction, it was found that Rijkswaterstaat, driven by the idea 
that the market was to be left responsible for managing the stakeholder relationships 
(Rijkswaterstaat’s “the market unless” policy), took a background position in the 
project’s implementation phase (i.e., cont instead of CONT). Although it was better 
connected to the complex institutional landscape of external project stakeholders, 
Rijkswaterstaat did not make active use of these stakeholder relationships when 
problems occurred during implementation (cf. Lenferink, 2014; Verweij, 2015a). As a 
consequence, the problems, most importantly the difficult cooperation between the 
project and the stakeholder environment, remained unsolved and even deteriorated. 
The third result – CONT*scope*SIZE*coop – offers a nuance to the identified 
importance of the externally-oriented and cooperative management approaches for 
producing satisfactory outcomes (cf. Edelenbos & Klijn, 2009). As can be seen from 
Table 4, the pattern is covered by three cases. It states that in D&C projects with a 
narrow scope and large size, cooperation can be contractual. Also, it indicates that 
management does not need to be externally-oriented to achieve satisfaction in 
implementation: the absence of management in the pattern means that it can be both 
externally-oriented (i.e., MAN) and internally-oriented (i.e., man). Case P.0029, for 
instance, was a rather straightforward road construction project that received little 
media attention, upon which it was decided to only use basic press notifications to 
inform external stakeholders about road closures for construction. The result 
suggests that less complex project implementations may need less far-reaching 
stakeholder management measures, and that more traditional modes of management 
and project organization can be relied upon (cf. Geraldi et al., 2011; Whitty & Maylor, 
2009). 
The fourth and final result from Table 4 – scope*SIZE*MAN*COOP – states 
that in projects with a narrow scope and a large size, externally-oriented management 
combined with cooperative public-private cooperation produces satisfactory 
outcomes in implementation. That is, although the third pattern indicated that it is 
not necessary in large projects with a narrow scope, externally-oriented management 
and a cooperative orientation still produce satisfactory outcomes. This further 
underpins the positive relationship between externally-oriented management and 
public-private cooperation for achieving satisfaction (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2009; 
Verweij & Gerrits, 2015). Interestingly, two of the projects covered by the pattern 
have DBFM contracts (i.e., P.0247 and P.0351). Whereas previous PPP studies 
suggested that DBFM contracts might amplify project-inward and contract-focused 
orientations (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2009; Edelenbos & Teisman, 2008; Verweij, 2015a), 
the cases P.0247 and P.0351 show that this is not necessarily true. 
 
5.2. Limitations of the research 
 
This study has a number of limitations requiring further research. First, although 
comparatively analyzing twenty-seven projects allowed for generalization, it 
restricted the extent to which implementation practices can be known in-depth. This 
is the classical trade-off between in-depth knowledge and the reconstruction of cross-
case patterns. Future case study research may delve into the implementation 
processes of the projects to further substantiate the findings of this research. Second, 
this study focused on how satisfactory outcomes are produced in implementation, but 
studies into ‘project failure’, especially when comparing them to ‘success cases’ can 
point to valuable additional ‘how not to implement’ lessons. The Rijkswaterstaat 
database, however, contained too few comparable truth table rows (inter alia due to 
the low consistency scores) to allow an elaborate comparison of cases with low 
satisfaction. Third, as can be seen from the data matrix (Table 2), there is little 
variation between the projects regarding contract type. The reason is that few DBFM 
projects have been or are implemented in the Netherlands. Contract type was still 
included so as to test the conjecture that the DBFM model might amplify project-
inward and contract-focused orientations (Verweij, 2015b). The implication here is 
that no bold conclusions should be drawn regarding the performance of DBFM in the 
Netherlands and that more research is needed to generate more conclusive results. 
Fourth, future research can also include project implementation cases from other 
countries so as to determine the generalizability of the present research findings 
beyond the Netherlands. Finally, in this study only project data from the side of the 
public procurer were collected and analyzed. This means that the private contractors’ 
perspectives on the projects are not included. An interesting avenue for future 
research is to combine project management data from the public and private 
partners. This would provide a stronger evidence-base for the research findings. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This study has multiple implications for PPP practice and research. First, 
implementers of PPP road infrastructure projects are generally better off when 
practicing externally-oriented management (cf. Edelenbos & Klijn, 2009; Verweij 
2015b). It is important to stress this (see Verweij, 2015b): in project planning, 
participatory approaches are often applied which closely involve external 
stakeholders such as citizens and public permitting organizations. However, when 
projects enter implementation, the focus tends to shift to managing projects by 
shielding them from the stakeholder environment as much as possible as it is 
perceived that this limits interruptions in the project’s planning (cf. Dimitriou et al., 
2013). However, external stakeholders do not ‘disappear’ after the project planning 
phase: externally-oriented management is very important to achieve satisfactory 
outcomes in dealing with stakeholder complexity in implementation. Second, 
whereas previous studies stressed the importance of close public-private cooperation 
in implementing projects (e.g., Verweij, 2015a; Verweij & Gerrits, 2015), the present 
research adds that this is particularly true for larger, more complex projects with 
wider scopes. Especially in DBFM contracts, the intensity of cooperation decreases in 
implementation as responsibilities are shifted to the private contractor (cf. Edelenbos 
& Teisman, 2008; Weihe, 2008), but this study concludes that governments better 
co-participate in implementation and that they use their recourses (most 
prominently, their relationships with external stakeholders) to aid satisfactory 
implementation. A nuance to this, thirdly, is that smaller and simpler projects may be 
managed by less cooperation that is thus more contractual (cf. Geraldi et al., 2011). 
This can increase efficiency for the public procurer (cf. De Schepper et al., 2014), but 
provided that well-working and trustworthy management information systems are in 
place that allow the procurer to monitor the project implementation at distance. 
Fourth and finally, DBFM contracts are often advocated by governments as the way 
forward in PPP (e.g., Rijkswaterstaat, 2014). However, previous studies suggested 
that DBFM does not always produce good results (Verweij, 2015a). This study 
concludes, in contrast, that this is not necessarily true. This contrasting finding 
implies that more research into DBFM is needed, to better understand the conditions 
under which this popular contract type can result in successful projects. 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
This work was supported by Next Generation Infrastructures [grant 03.24EUR]. The 
data for this article were provided by Rijkswaterstaat. In particular, Freek Wermer is 
thanked for making the access to the data possible. The contents of this article do not 
necessarily represent the views of Rijkswaterstaat, and are thus the researcher’s 
responsibility.  
 
References 
 
Atkin, B., & Skitmore, M., 2008. Editorial: stakeholder management in construction. 
Construction Management and Economics, 26(6), 549–552. 
Atkinson, R., 1999. Project management: cost, time and quality, two best guesses and 
a phenomenon, it’s time to accept other success criteria. International Journal 
of Project Management, 17(6), 337–342. 
Baccarini, D., 1996. The concept of project complexity - A review. International 
Journal of Project Management, 14(4), 201–204. 
Bertelsen, S., 2003. Construction as a complex system. Proceedings of the 
International Group for Lean Construction, 11. 
Blomquist, T., Hällgren, M., Nilsson, A., & Söderholm, A., 2010. Project-as-practice: 
In search of project management research that matters. Project Management 
Journal, 41(1), 5–16. 
Cantarelli, C. C., van Wee, B., Molin, E. J. E., & Flyvbjerg, B., 2012. Different cost 
performance: different determinants? The case of cost overruns in Dutch 
transport infrastructure projects. Transport Policy, 22, 88–95. 
Chan, A. P. C., Chan, D. W. M., & Ho, K. S. K., 2003. An empirical study of the 
benefits of construction partnering in Hong Kong. Construction Management 
and Economics, 21(5), 523–533. 
Cicmil, S., Williams, T., Thomas, J., & Hodgson, D., 2006. Rethinking project 
management: Researching the actuality of projects. International Journal of 
Project Management, 24(8), 675–686. 
Cronqvist, L., 2011. Tosmana: Tool for small-n analysis (Version 1.3.2.0). Trier: 
University of Trier. 
De Bruijn, H., & Leijten, M., 2008. Management characteristics of mega-projects. In 
H. Priemus, B. Flyvbjerg, & B. Van Wee (Eds.), Decision making on mega-
projects: Cost-benefit analysis, planning and innovation (pp. 23–39). 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
De Bruijn, H., ten Heuvelhof, E., & In’t Veld, R., 2010. Process management: Why 
project management fails in complex decision making processes. Berlin: 
Springer. 
De Schepper, S., Dooms, M., & Haezendonck, E., 2014. Stakeholder dynamics and 
responsibilities in public-private partnerships: A mixed experience. 
International Journal of Project Management, 32(7), 1210–1222. 
Dimitriou, H. T., Ward, E. J., & Wright, P. G., 2013. Mega transport projects - Beyond 
the “iron triangle”: Findings from the OMEGA research programme. Progress 
in Planning, 86, 1–43. 
Duşa, A., & Thiem, A., 2014. QCA: A package for qualitative comparative analysis 
(Version 1.1-4). 
Edelenbos, J., & Klijn, E. H., 2009. Project versus process management in public-
private partnership: Relation between management style and outcomes. 
International Public Management Journal, 12(3), 310–331. 
Edelenbos, J., & Teisman, G. R., 2008. Public–private partnership on the edge of 
project and process management: Insights from Dutch practice: The Sijtwende 
spatial development project. Environment and Planning C: Government and 
Policy, 26(3), 614 – 626. 
El-Gohary, N. M., Osman, H., & El-Diraby, T. E., 2006. Stakeholder management for 
public private partnerships. International Journal of Project Management, 
24(7), 595–604. 
Geraldi, J., Maylor, H., & Williams, T., 2011. Now, let’s make it really complex 
(complicated): A systematic review of the complexities of projects. International 
Journal of Operations & Production Management, 31(9), 966–990. 
Hamersma, M., Tillema, T., Sussman, J., & Arts, J., 2014. Residential satisfaction 
close to highways: The impact of accessibility, nuisances and highway 
adjustment projects. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 59, 
106–121. 
Heeres, N., Tillema, T., & Arts, J., 2012. Integration in Dutch planning of motorways: 
From “line” towards “area-oriented” approaches. Transport Policy, 24, 148–
158. 
Hertogh, M. J. C. M., & Westerveld, E., 2010. Playing with complexity: Management 
and organisation of large infrastructure projects. Rotterdam: Erasmus 
University Rotterdam. 
Jeffares, S., Sullivan, H., & Bovaird, T., 2013. Beyond the contract: The challenge of 
evaluating the performance(s) of public-private partnerships. In C. Greve & G. 
Hodge (Eds.), Rethinking public-private partnerships: strategies for turbulent 
times (pp. 166–187). New York: Routledge. 
Jones, R., & Noble, G., 2008. Managing the implementation of public-private 
partnerships. Public Money & Management, 28(2), 109–114. 
Kärnä, S., Junnonen, J.-M., Manninen, A.-P., & Julin, P., 2013. Exploring project 
participants’ satisfaction in the infrastructure projects. Engineering Project 
Organization Journal, 3(4), 186–197. 
Ke, Y., Wang, S., Chan, A. P., & Cheung, E., 2009. Research trend of public-private 
partnership in construction journals. Journal of Construction Engineering and 
Management, 135(10), 1076–1086. 
Klijn, E. H., & Teisman, G. R., 2005. Public-private partnerships as the management 
of co-production: Strategic and institutional obstacles in a difficult marriage. In 
G. Hodge & C. Greve (Eds.), The challenge of public-private partnerships: 
Learning from international experience (pp. 95–116). Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar. 
Koppenjan, J. F. M., & Klijn, E. H., 2004. Managing uncertainties in networks: A 
network approach to problem solving and decision making. London: 
Routledge. 
Kwak, Y. H., Chih, Y. Y., & Ibbs, C. W., 2009. Towards a comprehensive 
understanding of public private partnerships for infrastructure development. 
California Management Review, 51(2), 51–78. 
Larson, E., 1997. Partnering on construction projects: a study of the relationship 
between partnering activities and project success. IEEE Transactions on 
Engineering Management, 44(2), 188–195. 
Lehtiranta, L., Kärnä, S., Junnonen, J.-M., & Julin, P., 2012. The role of multi-firm 
satisfaction in construction project success. Construction Management and 
Economics, 30(6), 463–475. 
Lenferink, S., 2014. Marktbetrokkenheid bij infrastructuurontwikkeling: 10 lessen 
voor het plan- en aanbestedingsproces. Nijmegen: Radboud Universiteit 
Nijmegen. 
Leung, M., Ng, S. T., & Cheung, S., 2004. Measuring construction project participant 
satisfaction. Construction Management and Economics, 22(3), 319–331. 
Metze, M., 2010. Veranderend getij. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Balans. 
Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment., 2013. MIRT projectenboek 2014. 
Den Haag: Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu. 
Nijkamp, P., Van der Burch, M., & Vindigni, G., 2002. A comparative institutional 
evaluation of public-private partnerships in Dutch urban land-use and 
revitalisation projects. Urban Studies, 39(10), 1865–1880. 
Olander, S., & Landin, A., 2005. Evaluation of stakeholder influence in the 
implementation of construction projects. International Journal of Project 
Management, 23(4), 321–328. 
Pressman, J. L., & Wildavsky, A., [1973]1984. Implementation: How great 
expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland; Or, why it's amazing that 
federal programs work at all, this being a saga of the economic development 
administration as told by two sympathetic observers who seek to build morals 
on a foundation of ruined hopes. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Provalis Research., 2013. QDA miner lite (Version 1.3). 
Ragin, C. C., 1992. Casing and the process of social inquiry. In C. C. Ragin & H. S. 
Becker (Eds.), What is a case? Exploring the foundations of social inquiry (pp. 
217–226). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ragin, C. C., 2008. Redesigning social inquiry: Fuzzy sets and beyond. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
Ragin, C. C., 2009. Qualitative comparative analysis using fuzzy sets (fsQCA). In C. C. 
Ragin & B. Rihoux (Eds.), Configurational comparative methods: Qualitative 
comparative analysis (QCA) and related techniques (pp. 87–121). Thousand 
Oaks: Sage. 
Ragin, C. C., & Sonnett, J., 2005. Between complexity and parsimony: Limited 
diversity, counterfactual cases, and comparative analysis. In S. Kropp & M. 
Minkenberg (Eds.), Vergleichen in der politik-wissenschaft (pp. 180–197). 
Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
Reynaers, A., 2014. It takes two to tangle: Public-private partnerships and their 
impact on public values. Amsterdam: VU University Amsterdam. 
Rihoux, B., 2013. Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), anno 2013: Reframing The 
Comparative Method’s seminal statements. Swiss Political Science Review, 
19(2), 233–245. 
Rihoux, B., & Lobe, B., 2009. The case for qualitative comparative analysis (QCA): 
Adding leverage for thick cross-case comparison. In D. S. Byrne & C. C. Ragin 
(Eds.), The Sage handbook of case-based methods (pp. 222–242). London: 
Sage. 
Rijkswaterstaat., 2011. Ondernemingsplan 2015: Eén Rijkswaterstaat, elke dag 
beter!. Den Haag: Rijkswaterstaat. 
Rijkswaterstaat., 2014. Annual report Rijkswaterstaat: 2013. The Hague: 
Rijkswaterstaat. 
Schneider, C. Q., & Wagemann, C., 2010. Standards of good practice in qualitative 
comparative analysis (QCA) and fuzzy-sets. Comparative Sociology, 9(3), 397–
418. 
Schneider, C. Q., & Wagemann, C., 2012. Set-theoretic methods for the social 
sciences: A guide to qualitative comparative analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Tang, L., Shen, Q., & Cheng, E. W. L., 2010. A review of studies on public-private 
partnership projects in the construction industry. International Journal of 
Project Management, 28(7), 683–694. 
Teisman, G. R., Westerveld, E., & Hertogh, M. J. C. M., 2009. Appearances and 
sources of process dynamics: The case of infrastructure development in the UK 
and the Netherlands. In G. R. Teisman, A. Van Buuren, & L. M. Gerrits (Eds.), 
Managing complex governance systems: Dynamics, self-organization and 
coevolution in public investments (pp. 56–75). New York: Routledge. 
Thiem, A., & Duşa, A., 2013. Qualitative comparative analysis with R: A user’s 
guide. New York: Springer. 
Verweij, S., 2015a. Achieving satisfaction when implementing PPP transportation 
infrastructure projects: A qualitative comparative analysis of the A15 highway 
DBFM project. International Journal of Project Management, 33(1), 189–200. 
Verweij, S., 2015b. Once the shovel hits the ground: Evaluating the management of 
complex implementation processes of public-private partnership 
infrastructure projects with qualitative comparative analysis. Rotterdam: 
Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
Verweij, S., & Gerrits, L. M., 2013. Understanding and researching complexity with 
qualitative comparative analysis: Evaluating transportation infrastructure 
projects. Evaluation, 19(1), 40–55. 
Verweij, S., & Gerrits, L. M., 2015. How satisfaction is achieved in the 
implementation phase of large transportation infrastructure projects: A 
qualitative comparative analysis into the A2 tunnel project. Public Works 
Management & Policy, 20(1), 5–28. 
Verweij, S., Van Meerkerk, I. F., & Korthagen, I. A., 2015. Reasons for contract 
changes in implementing Dutch transportation infrastructure projects: An 
empirical exploration. Transport Policy, 37(1), 195–202. 
Weihe, G., 2008. Public-private partnerships and public-private value trade-offs. 
Public Money & Management, 28(3), 153–158. 
Whitty, S. J., & Maylor, H., 2009. And then came complex project management 
(revised). International Journal of Project Management, 27(3), 304–310. 
Yescombe, E. R., 2007. Public-private partnerships: Principles for policy and 
finance. Burlington: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
 
